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Covid-19	and	economic	development	in	Latin	America
With	the	economic	impact	of	Covid-19	shaping	up	to	be	immense	and	inevitable,	Latin	America
desperately	needs	to	reverse	the	failures	of	its	export-oriented	development	model,	writes	Tobias
Franz	(SOAS,	University	of	London).
Aside	from	its	massivee	implications	for	public	health,	the	global	Covid-19	pandemic	will	have	serious
effects	on	economic	development	in	Latin	America.	Even	before	the	outbreak	of	Covid-19,	Latin
America’s	economy	was	growing	at	an	annual	average	rate	of	less	than	one	per	cent	per	year,	making	it	the
slowest	growing	region	in	the	Global	South.	Already	struggling	to	recover	from	the	end	of	the	commodity	boom	and
the	oil	price	crash,	Latin	America	now	faces	the	prospect	of	sliding	into	a	deep	economic	depression.
Will	Covid-19	lead	to	a	new	shift	in	development	thinking	in	Latin	America?	(Mexico,	detail	of	Curt
Carnemark/World	Bank,	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
The	elite	politics	of	low	productive	capacity
From	the	1980s	debt	crisis,	via	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2007/08,	to	the	slump	in	global	commodity	prices	since
2015,	Latin	American	economies	have	long	been	highly	vulnerable	to	external	shocks.	The	problem	is	a	structural
one.
Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	most	of	Latin	America	failed	to	industrialise	beyond	early-stage	light
manufacturing	and	into	later	stages	that	enable	greater	productivity	growth.	The	historical	domination	of	political
and	economic	life	by	landed	elites	prevented	the	establishment	of	a	power	base	that	would	facilitate	industrial
accumulation.	A	lack	of	competition	between	different	elite	factions	and	the	strong	position	of	land-owning	classes
made	it	difficult	for	emerging	industrialists	to	compete	over	access	to	state	resources.	While	the	dominance	of
unproductive	resource	distribution	was	less	problematic	during	the	early	stages	of	industrialisation,	it	significantly
hampered	attempts	to	promote	big-push	capital-intensive	industrialisation.
This	inability	to	develop	a	productive	sector	and	a	deepening	dependence	on	primary-commodity	exports	and
services	(often	linked	to	tourism)	have	left	most	Latin	American	economies	in	a	position	where	minor	changes	to	the
global	economy	have	significant	ripple	effects.	This	is	already	visible	with	the	drop	in	global	demand,	the	collapse	of
commodity	prices,	and	the	near	death	of	international	travel	that	have	resulted	from	the	Covid-19	crisis.
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This	year	alone,	oil	prices	contracted	by	over	50	per	cent,	and	they	are	now	standing	at	their	lowest	level	since
1973	(US$	22	per	barrel).	Coal	prices	fell	by	55	per	cent,	the	tradable	value	of	copper	decreased	by	21.3	per	cent,
zinc	by	19.4	per	cent,	lead	by	14.6	per	cent,	and	soy	beans	by	7.7	per	cent.
With	Brazil,	Colombia,	Mexico,	Ecuador,	and	Venezuela	heavily	dependent	on	oil	revenues;	Colombia	being	the
world’s	fifth	largest	coal	exporter;	Chile	constituting	the	largest	copper	exporter;	and	Peru	depending	on	copper,
zinc,	and	lead	exports;	the	Covid-19	crisis	has	already	had	serious	detrimental	effects	on	Latin	America’s
economies.
This	longstanding	tendency	towards	export-oriented	extractive	accumulation	over	local	productive	capacity	is	now
demonstrating	the	structural	weaknesses	of	Latin	America’s	economies.	Entrenched	power	balances	and	the
dominant	position	of	landed	elites	are	likely	to	further	deepen	productivity	problems	as	state	provision	of	emergency
loans	and	stimulus	packages	could	easily	favour	commodity	giants,	leaving	smaller	industrial	companies	to	drift	into
bankruptcy.
Neoliberalised	political	economies
This	historical	failure	to	climb	the	productivity	and	technology	ladder	has	been	reinforced	since	elites	in	Latin
America	reversed	state-sponsored	import	substitution	industrialisation	and	started	to	fundamentally	reorganise	the
institutional	configuration	of	their	political	economies.	The	1980s	and	1990s	saw	an	outbreak	of	what	prominent
development	economist	Albert	O.	Hirschman	dubbed	“fracasomania”	(“failuremania”).	This	obsession	with
dismissing	everything	that	went	before	as	a	complete	failure	saw	Latin	American	countries	implement	a	wide	range
of	radical	neoliberal	reforms.
Aside	from	its	effects	on	public	health	systems	that	are	today	wholly	unprepared	for	the	looming	Covid-19	health
crisis,	the	quasi-religious	adoption	of	the	neoliberal	policy	paradigm	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	also	weakened
governments’	attempts	to	diversify	their	economies.	The	incapacity	of	rolled-back	states	to	enforce	credible
disciplining	mechanisms	has	hindered	attempts	to	compel	corporations	to	invest	in	strategic	sectoral	activities,
reinforcing	low	growth	of	productivity	and	GDP	per	capita	(as	illustrated	below).
Source:	IMF,	World	Bank,	ILO	via	McKinsey	Global	Institute	(2017)
Elites	unwilling	to	reinvest	their	profits	continue	to	benefit	from	Latin	American	neoliberalism,	as	they	appropriate
large	profits	without	fear	of	withdrawal	of	government	support	or	deteriorating	competitiveness.	Irrespective	of
whether	we	measure	investment	as	investment	per	worker,	a	percentage	of	profits,	or	a	percentage	of	GDP,	Latin
America	has	extremely	low	private	investment	ratios.	This	has	left	the	region’s	firms	with	little	capacity	for
productivity	growth	and	its	economies	dominated	by	low-wage	or	informal	labour.
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Liberalisation	and	integration	into	transnationalised	networks	of	capitalism	worsened	this	situation.	Rather	than
investing	in	the	generation	of	domestic	content,	Latin	American	elites	continue	to	prioritise	the	advancement	of	the
system	of	global	finance	capitalism	from	which	the	vast	majority	of	their	income	is	derived.	Elites	accumulate	large
surpluses	mainly	through	moving	capital	from	the	real	economy	into	the	increasingly	sophisticated	financial	system.
Combined	with	increasing	income	inequalities	and	the	ever-contracting	absorptive	capacity	of	domestic	firms	in	the
real	economy,	this	has	accentuated	problems	of	underinvestment	and	weak	effective	demand.
This	deep	neoliberalisation	of	Latin	American	countries	will	seriously	weaken	responses	to	the	Covid-19	crisis	and
lead	to	devastating	consequences	for	the	population.	While	debilitated	states	will	struggle	to	support	strategically
important	businesses,	the	low-wage	and	informal	labour	force	will	take	the	hardest	hit.	With	welfare	states	having
been	bled	dry,	workers	have	nothing	to	fall	back	on,	no	safety	net	or	savings,	and	no	access	to	quality	healthcare.	It
is	Latin	America’s	poor	who	will	once	again	be	on	the	sharp	end	of	the	neoliberal	paradigm.
Financialisation	and	the	explosion	of	private	debt
Another	major	concern	in	the	Covid-19	crisis	is	surging	corporate	debt.
Following	the	downturn	of	2009,	Latin	American	elites	leveraged	their	corporations	by	borrowing	to	finance
operations	rather	than	reinvesting	profits.	Financialisation	of	the	economy	has	facilitated	access	to	cheap	credit,
allowing	unprofitable	and	uncompetitive	firms	to	survive	as	asset	prices	ballooned	despite	plateauing	productivity.
Low	interest	rates	and	quantitative	easing	(QE)	–	an	attempt	to	stimulate	economic	recovery	in	the	Global	North
and	stabilise	international	financial	markets	–	resulted	in	an	expansion	of	debt	on	the	balance	sheets	of	non-bank
corporations	in	Latin	America.	Using	cheap	credit	made	available	by	QE,	speculative	investors	from	the	Global
North	sought	refuge	in	the	profitable	corporate	bonds,	equities,	shares,	and	stocks	of	commodity-producing
companies	in	Latin	America.	These	companies	readily	accepted	this	excess	liquidity	even	if	it	only	increased	their
leverage.
Rather	than	investing	these	additional	funds	into	strategic	industrial	sectors,	Latin	America’s	elites	used	cheap
credit	to	finance	corporate	deficits	or	to	move	assets	into	financial	markets.	As	such,	the	surge	in	foreign	direct
investment	since	QE	has	had	no	observable	impact	on	domestic	investment	rates	into	the	real	economy	(see
below).
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Note:	a	=	implementation	of	US	Federal	Reserve	QE,	Source:	Palma	(2015)
Before	the	Covid-19	crisis,	the	massive	inflow	of	foreign	investments	into	Latin	American	economies	inflated	asset
prices	and	led	to	a	surge	of	commodity	prices.	But	since	the	start	of	the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	investors	have
been	rushing	to	withdraw	funds	from	Latin	America.	This	has	led	to	a	further	fall	in	already	collapsing	global
commodity	prices	and	a	sharp	decline	in	asset	prices,	further	imperilling	debt	sustainability.
Moreover,	and	following	general	trends	related	to	economic	financialisation,	household	debt	in	Latin	America’s
largest	economies	has	increased	from	an	average	of	around	10	per	cent	of	GDP	in	2002	to	over	25	per	cent	in
2018	(illustrated	below).	With	wages	in	the	region’s	highly	flexibilised	labour	markets	being	systematically
suppressed,	households	have	turned	to	easy	credit	in	order	to	finance	consumption.	Even	this	increased	private
debt	burden,	however,	fails	to	make	up	for	Latin	America’s	chronic	deficiency	in	effective	demand	as	a	result	of
undervalued,	flexibilised	labour.
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Source:	IMF	(2019)
Another	aggravating	factor	for	Latin	American	economies	in	the	current	Covid-19	crisis	is	the	structural	weakness	of
local	currencies.
The	massive	influx	of	liquidity	pre-crisis	and	the	inadequate	response	of	central	banks	has	led	to	appreciation	and
overvaluation	of	local	currencies.	With	the	outbreak	of	Covid-19,	panicking	investors	are	massively	withdrawing
funds	from	Latin	America	and	disinvesting	from	commodity	assets,	putting	local	currencies	under	extreme	pressure.
Exchange	rates	have	fallen	far	lower	even	than	after	the	financial	crisis	of	2007/08.
In	the	last	40	days	alone,	the	Mexican	peso	has	lost	35	per	cent	of	its	value	against	the	US	dollar,	the	Brazilian	real
and	the	Colombian	peso	both	fell	by	24	per	cent,	whereas	the	Chilean	and	Argentinean	pesos	contracted	by	10	per
cent	and	8	per	cent	respectively.	Given	that	most	private	and	public	debt	in	the	region	is	held	in	US	dollars,	the
Covid-19	crisis	will	seriously	worsen	an	already	parlous	debt	position.
Note:	data	for	2020	Q1	until	March	25,	Source:	UNCTAD	based	on	Thomson	Reuters	Eikon
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The	withdrawal	of	finance,	the	collapse	of	inflated	assets,	the	free	fall	of	exchange	rates,	the	bursting	of	corporate-
bond	bubbles,	and	the	uncontrolled	indebtedness	of	corporations	and	households	will	have	catastrophic
consequences	–	not	just	for	companies	in	the	region	but	also	and	especially	for	poorer	individuals	and	households.
The	coming	economic	costs	of	Covid-19	in	Latin	America
Current	calculations	of	the	impact	of	Covid-19	suggest	that	Latin	America’s	economies	are	facing	a	serious
depression.	According	to	the	recent	Wold	Economic	Outlook	(14	April	2020)	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund
(IMF),	the	region’s	economy	will	shrink	by	an	average	of	4.2	per	cent.	This	contraction	would	be	even	more	severe
than	those	experienced	during	the	1983	debt	crisis	and	the	2009	recession.
Brazil‘s	economy	is	expected	to	contract	by	5.3%
Mexico’s	reliance	on	demand	from	the	US	(about	a	third	of	its	GDP	comes	from	exports)	will	dampen	growth
prospects	significantly,	with	a	contraction	of	6.6%
Argentina’s	economy	is	set	to	shrink	by	5.7%,	with	the	further	challenge	of	having	to	complete	ongoing
renegotiation	of	debts	worth	US$100	billion
Colombia’s	economy	could	see	a	2.4%	contraction
Chile’s	economy	is	projected	to	contract	by	over	4.5%.
Peru	will	see	an	economic	contraction	of	4.5%
Central	American	economies	will	shrink	by	an	average	of	3%
Economies	in	the	Caribbean	will	likely	contract	by	2.8%
As	the	economic	and	health	crisis	deepens	and	global	demand	(particularly	from	China	and	the	US)	falls	further,
these	already	dire	economic	projections	may	need	to	be	revised	downward.	Latin	American	economies	have	to
start	preparing	for	a	serious	depression,	as	the	consequences	of	the	Covid-19	crisis	will	be	catastrophic:	an
unprecedented	decline	in	trade	and	commerce,	corporations	defaulting	or	going	bankrupt	due	to	exploding	debt
burdens	and	a	credit	crunch,	sovereign	debt	crises	and	further	currency	devaluations,	financial	crises	resulting	from
corporate	and	household	defaults	on	private	debts,	and	a	huge	jump	in	unemployment,	poverty,	and	inequality.
Multilateral	responses,	led	by	the	IMF,	have	already	seen	an	expansion	of	the	Catastrophe	Containment	and	Relief
Trust	(CCRT)	to	support	the	balance	of	payments	for	poor	countries.	The	IMF	will	also	need	to	create	new	special
drawing	rights	(SDRs)	and	transfer	existing	ones;	this	will	help	embattled	governments	to	free	up	fiscal	resources	to
increase	health	care	funding,	to	finance	key	imports,	and	to	address	crucial	supply	bottlenecks.
However,	high	levels	of	public	and	private	debt	could	easily	render	these	efforts	futile	since	additional	loans	will	be
used	to	finance	the	exploding	debt	burden.	A	moratorium	on	debt	servicing	is	not	enough;	a	crisis	of	these
proportions	calls	for	complete	cancellation.
The	looming	economic	crisis	can	only	be	addressed	if	Latin	American	governments	start	to	radically	rethink
economic	policymaking.	The	creation	of	new	fiscal	resources	–	perhaps	through	monetised	deficits	and	monetary
financing	of	government	spending	where	possible	–	needs	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	the	reversal	of	privatisation
reforms	and	the	nationalisation	of	commodity-extracting	companies.	A	shift	towards	a	state-led	development	model
that	can	make	best	use	of	nationalised	extractive	revenues	and	newly	created	fiscal	resources	is	also	necessary.
As	an	immediate	response,	governments	could	help	to	ameliorate	the	liquidity	and	solvency	problems	of
households	by	suspending	mortgage	and	rent	payments,	creating	unconditional	cash	transfer	programmes,	and
investing	in	social	services	in	order	to	mitigate	the	pressures	bearing	on	those	in	low-wage	or	informal	employment
without	access	to	savings	or	healthcare.	Businesses	could	be	supported	by	extending	loan	maturities,	deferring
taxes,	providing	credit	through	central	bank	finance,	and	subsidising	companies	to	maintain	employment.	Equity
injections	and	government	guarantees	should	provide	ample	liquidity	to	banks,	particularly	those	lending	to	small
and	medium-sized	enterprises.
Short-	to	medium-term	monetary	and	fiscal	stimuli	would	have	to	be	accompanied	by	longer-term	strategies	to	build
up	and	support	strategic	manufacturing	industries.	This	would	not	only	break	the	vicious	cycle	of	low-productivity
growth	and	a	low-wage,	precarious	employment	market,	it	would	also	begin	to	tackle	the	region’s	dependency	on
global	demand	for	commodities.
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With	the	economic	impact	of	Covid-19	shaping	up	to	be	both	immense	and	inevitable,	the	region	is	in	desperate
need	of	a	radical	reversal	of	its	failed	neoliberal,	export-oriented	development	model	based	on	extractive	industries
and	agro-industrial	accumulation.
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